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23 March 1961

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

DIA and DOS have no objection to declassification and release

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23 March 1961

### DAILY BRIEF

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**\*Warsaw Pact:** The chief purpose of the Warsaw Pact meeting announced for 28 March in Moscow is to create a forum from which to respond to Western moves on the Laotian situation. This meeting of the Pact's Political Consultative Committee is timed to follow the current meeting in Bangkok of SEATO military advisers and the opening on 27 March of the meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers. Moscow probably feels that the Laotian situation is moving into a new and decisive phase which may require high-level coordination of future bloc steps and which in any event makes desirable a new demonstration of bloc solidarity. Yesterday's TASS announcement refers, as did the announcement prior to a similar session last year, to a meeting at the "top level." This suggests that Eastern European party leaders and premiers may again attend along with the foreign and defense ministers, who are specifically mentioned in the

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announcement. Such a meeting could provide an occasion for Khrushchev to break his long public silence on foreign affairs. It is probable that next week's session will cover the Berlin question, at least on a pro forma basis, and possibly in a more threatening context. [REDACTED]  
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Communist China: Foreign Minister Chen Yi, in an interview published in Hungary's party newspaper, has said that it will not be possible for Peiping to enter the UN until the US ends its "occupation" of Taiwan and withdraws its armed forces from the area. Heretofore, Peiping's public statements on UN representation have not gone beyond insistence on the ouster from the UN of the Chinese Nationalists. While Peiping has not issued an official policy statement along these lines, the Chinese Communists may believe that international pressures for their participation in the UN have reached a point that encourages them to press their demands for a US withdrawal from Taiwan with new vigor. [REDACTED] (Backup, Page 4)

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[REDACTED]

**Ethiopia:** The Emperor on 21 March met a deputation of 500 unarmed enlisted men representing all army units in the Addis Ababa area, following peaceful demonstrations by these troops who were protesting against low pay scales. The troops dispersed peacefully after the Emperor promised to institute a full probe to rectify inequities in army pay scales. They reportedly remained dissatisfied, however, and reconvened into smaller groups to discuss further moves. The Emperor appears reluctant to yield to the soldiers' demands despite warnings from senior army leaders that they will be unable to control the troops unless concessions are forthcoming. The populace in the capital is apparently becoming more sympathetic to demands for reform. [REDACTED]

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**Morocco-Spanish Sahara:** King Hassan II is exploiting the capture and release of the 11 foreign oil technicians--including three Americans--to further Morocco's claims to Spanish Sahara, in the opinion of the American charge d'affaires and the British ambassador in Rabat. These officials believe that the King's communiqué, issued simultaneously with his theatrical release of the captured men to their respective embassies, contains a clear threat that other oil prospectors in northern Spanish Sahara will get similar treatment. At the same time, Hassan indicated he was willing to negotiate Morocco's claim to the Sahara with Spain and France.

The Spanish command in the Canary Islands claims that Spanish forces in northeastern Spanish Sahara have surrounded an invading Moroccan group and are attacking it from land and air. [REDACTED]

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**WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS**

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee the United States Intelligence Board concludes that:

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- A. No change from last week.
- B. No change from last week.

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**DAILY BRIEF**

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### Warsaw Pact Meeting

On intra-bloc matters, the Soviet leaders could use next week's meeting as an opportunity to apply new pressures designed to bring Albania back into line with the USSR. In the military field, discussion of a possible reduction in Soviet forces in Hungary might be on the agenda, as might also be plans for Warsaw pact combined-training exercises later this year.

Meetings of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee have been used since the Pact's formation in 1955 as a forum for discussion of a wide range of pressing political matters by Soviet bloc leaders. These meetings have been attended by observers from Communist China; last year's session was attended also by observers from North Vietnam and North Korea. The final communiques of these various meetings have announced a unified bloc position on the questions at issue.

Thus the meeting in February 1960, although marred by sharp Sino-Soviet differences, issued a statement which forcefully restated the Soviet position on the Berlin and German issues and outlined those topics the USSR intended to discuss at the then-forthcoming Big Four "summit" meeting. The communique following the April 1959 meeting was directed toward the issues to be considered at the Big Four foreign ministers' conference that spring. The May 1958 meeting was used to attack the theses issued a month earlier by a congress of the Yugoslav party and to widen the break in party relations between the bloc and Belgrade. The meetings in 1958 and 1960, though not the one in 1959, were attended by Soviet bloc party leaders and chiefs of state, in addition to the foreign and defense ministers. [REDACTED]

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Peiping Expands Conditions for UN Seat

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[Peiping's reported new demand is a logical expansion of its thesis that "imperialism--especially US imperialism--" is the greatest danger in the world and that the Communist bloc's efforts must be devoted to a no-holds-barred struggle against it. This attitude is reflected in Peiping's current insistence on the withdrawal of US forces and the recognition of its claim to Taiwan as a necessary preliminary to the settlement of all Sino-US problems.]


[Following the 103rd Sino-US ambassadorial meeting in Warsaw on 7 March, Peiping said it would be difficult to reach agreement with the US on any matter until the US ends its "occupation" of Taiwan. Peiping now may be seeking to take the issue outside the field of bilateral Sino-US relations and force its consideration in the UN. The Chinese Communists may also intend through this maneuver to make it more difficult for any consideration in the UN of a "two Chinas" solution.]

[The new condition may not reflect a firm policy position. Peiping may be employing the familiar tactic of setting a high price in preparation for bargaining later. Chou En-lai may have been hinting at the nature of a compromise acceptable to Peiping when he told Edgar Snow last November that the US must agree to withdraw its forces but added that as to the specific steps on when and how to withdraw, "they are matters for subsequent discussion."]

[Many UN members which now support Peiping's entry into the UN would probably be unwilling to attempt to accommodate the Chinese Communists beyond voting to seat Peiping's representative. These members believe that UN membership is a privilege as well as a right and therefore would consider Peiping's demands demeaning to the organization. Britain's recent announcement that Communist China should be seated in the United Nations has subsequently been amplified by a Foreign Office private view that no conditions]

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[could be attached by Taipei's supporters to the seating of Peiping. On the other hand, the Foreign Office would oppose the Chinese Communists if Peiping advanced such conditions as UN recognition that Taiwan belonged to China or that charges of aggression against Communist China be expunged from UN records.]



### Army Dissidence Threatens Ethiopia

Ambassador Richards indicated on 22 March that while an uneasy calm has returned to Addis Ababa, trouble could break out again unless the Emperor acts quickly to accommodate the army dissidents' demands.

The Emperor's attempts to date to reduce the growing criticism of his regime appear to have failed. He sought to alleviate army discontent on 14 March by announcing a modest increase in its pay scales and to quell dissension among junior and middle-level officers the next day by promoting 73 army officers. The pay increase, however, which is to come from the present army budget, falls considerably short of that promised by the rebel leadership last December. Moreover, air force, police, and navy personnel will be aroused over being denied a pay raise equal to that given the army, while army officers are likely to regard their promotions simply as a counterbalance to those given air force officers last month. Police officials are also displeased because the Emperor recently appointed an army officer instead of a career police official as commissioner of police.

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Handbills, which may have originated in the Ministry of Defense, were circulated in the capital on 20 March setting forth the demands of the dissidents. These included--in addition to the pay raise--the dismissal of Chief of Staff Kebede and other high government officials, threatening direct action if they are not complied with.

The American army attaché notes that the dissidents apparently have succeeded in establishing organizational ties through several if not all local army units. A leader capable of directing action against the regime is not yet known to have emerged, however. Although army officers reportedly have

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secured all arms in unit armories, the troops could recover these weapons through mass action if the situation were to get out of hand.

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Moroccan Claims to Saharan Territories

Soon after Spain published regulations on 15 June 1959 for the exploitation of petroleum resources in the Spanish Sahara, the Moroccan Embassy in Madrid made known Morocco's claims of sovereignty over the region. The Moroccan economic counselor in Madrid indicated at that time that he thought American oil companies should be advised this was a contested area and that they might subsequently have to renegotiate their status with another government. The following year, nine American firms obtained concessions from the Spanish Government, and by January 1961, 38 American teams were engaged in exploratory work. Emphasis was placed on the northwestern part of the Spanish Sahara because of the availability of supply lines and water. The United Oil Company, whose 11 employees were captured--apparently by Moroccan irregulars at the direction of the Moroccan Army--on 11 March, had recently ceased operations in Latin America to concentrate on exploratory work in Spanish Sahara and Australia.

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The Moroccan press, meanwhile, continues to play up charges of Spain's aggressive intentions, reporting on 21 March the arrival of Spanish reinforcements not only in Spanish Sahara but also in the Spanish-held presidios of Ceuta and Melilla on Morocco's Mediterranean coast. It also claims that Spanish military aircraft created havoc among the population by flying low over the southern Moroccan town of Tarfaya on 20 March, and

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continues to charge Spanish authorities with kidnaping a team of four Italian oil prospectors operating in the Tarfaya area.

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The Secretary of the Navy

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The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

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